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ABSTRACT 
 
Gender affects household spending in two areas that have been widely studied in the 
literature. One strand documents that greater female bargaining power within households 
results in a variety of shifts in household production and consumption. An important 
source of intrahousehold bargaining power is ownership of assets, especially land. 
Another strand examines gender bias in spending on children. This paper addresses both 
strands simultaneously. In it, differences in spending on education are examined 
empirically, at both the household and the individual level. Results are mixed, though the 
balance of evidence weighs toward pro-male bias in spending on education at the 
household level. Results also indicate that the relationship between asset ownership and 
female bargaining power within the household is contingent on the type of asset. 
 
Keywords: Gender Bias; Education; Assets; Intrahousehold Allocation; Latin America; 
Paraguay 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This paper attempts to organize thinking about the impact of gender on household 
decision making processes and to apply that organized framework to the task of assessing 
the impact of gender on the composition of education expenditures in Paraguay. I explore 
two aspects of gendered patterns in expenditure decision making within households. 
First, I examine the importance of female bargaining power (as measured by the proxies 
of female landownership, homeownership, and female income share). Second, I 
investigate the occurrence of bias in spending on children in the household based on their 
sex. The empirical analysis focuses on education spending. 
Gender patterns in decision making can be divided into two broad categories. The 
first category includes systematic differences in economic decision making between 
sexes, presumably the result of gender formation or, more controversially, inherent 
differences. We could call these subjective gender patterns, since the focus is on the 
decision maker. The second category includes systematic differences in the allocation of 
resources depending on the sex of the recipients. These patterns could be called objective 
gender patterns, since the focus is on the object of the decision (this is commonly 
referred to as gender bias). This breakdown could certainly be applied to extrahousehold 
phenomena, as well as interactions between households and institutions, by 
characterizing the various sides of such interactions by gender. And so, individuals in 
households could occupy a number of positions with respect to various instances of 
gender patterns in a given context. For example, a female household head could be on the 
receiving end of pro-male extrahousehold gender patterns (perhaps by not being 
approved for a farm production loan that an otherwise identical male household head 
would receive), while simultaneously being the agent of pro-male intrahousehold gender 
patterns (for example, leaving the lion’s share of her land to her eldest son). Since this 
paper explicitly focuses on intrahousehold phenomena, from this point forward all 
mentions of gender patterns will refer to the intrahousehold variety. 
There is a wide and growing literature within the intersection of development 
economics and feminist economics on both types of gender patterns. Most of the 
literature falls into one or the other category. With the empirical work, this is doubtless   3
due to the data available. The information necessary to assess objective gender patterns 
(information about actual decision making processes and power) is rarely available. This 
lack of data means that the presence of objective gender patterns must usually be 
inferred. Data on spending on an individual level is much more common. Therefore, the 
presence of subjective gender patterns lends itself much more easily to detection in many 
cases. 
Literature that attempts to describe the presence of gender patterns frequently 
focuses on outcomes. The prevalence of such studies is easy to understand, since the 
analysis is fairly straightforward and the data required is relatively easy to acquire. 
However, when researchers attempt to directly test for evidence of gender patterns in 
intrahousehold allocation, several obstacles immediately present themselves. First, the 
ideal data required for analyzing gender patterns (information on not only expenditures 
on every item by individual within household, but also information regarding how 
decisions are made) is almost never available.  
Many of the studies on subjective gender patterns have focused on outcomes, 
employing indirect testing for gender patterns. The circumstantial evidence for the 
existence of pro-male bias has been documented widely. In numerous studies, boys are 
found to have better school outcomes (Behrman, Pollak, and Taubman 1982; Deolalikar 
1993; Davies and Zhang 1995; Nkamleu and Kielland 2006) or to have better health 
outcomes (Rosenzweig and Schultz 1982; Bairagi 1986; Das Gupta 1987; Rosenzweig 
and Wolpin 1988; Senauer, Garcia, and Jacinto 1988). However, finding evidence of 
actual pro-male bias in intrahousehold resource allocation has been more elusive 
(Kingdon 2005). 
Much of the literature on intrahousehold resource allocation that focuses on 
objective gender patterns studies how decisions are made within the household and the 
differential impact that bargaining power by gender has on household welfare in general. 
From a starting point of the unitary household model (in which households are assumed 
to be units within which egalitarian principles automatically apply to the distribution of 
resources among members, or are enforced by a benevolent dictator), the theory of the 
household has moved on to more nuanced analyses of intrahousehold distributional 
dynamics. Bargaining models allow us to consider the role of the relative bargaining   4
positions of different household members in distribution decisions (Folbre 1984). For the 
most part these models assume binary pairs of “players,” bargaining over who gets what. 
Early models assumed Pareto efficient outcomes, but empirical evidence does not support 
that assumption. We are left with an analysis in which outcomes are determined by the 
relative bargaining positions of household members and the institutional structures within 
which they interact, which need not necessarily be technically or allocatively efficient 
(Udry 1996; Agarwal 1997). 
In many of these studies, the gender balance of power is measured using income. 
Studies of income effects on household welfare show that female income provides an 
advantage (Senauer, Garcia, and Jacinto 1988; Thomas 1990; Brown, Yohannes, and 
Webb 1994). Refinements of this type of study have examined the “lumpiness” of income 
to show that food expenditures depend on gender-disaggregated seasonal income flows 
(Hopkins, Levin, and Haddad 1994). The general conclusion drawn from these studies is 
that greater female income leads to greater spending on household welfare (food, health 
care, and education). Others have theorized that control over land should have a similar 
affect (Agarwal 1994). The extension to assets in general will be under closer scrutiny in 
this study. 
Few studies attempt to analyze both aspects of gender’s impact on household 
welfare simultaneously. This paper represents an attempt to do just that. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows. Section II lays out the data I use in my analysis, the 
methods I employ, and the model I use. Section III presents the results of the analysis for 
household-level spending. Section IV presents the results of the analysis of individual-
level spending. Section V summarizes the conclusions to be drawn from the analysis and 
suggests some ways forward. 
 
II. DATA AND METHODS 
 
The data used in this analysis is from the 2000–2001 Encuesta Integrada de Hogares 
(MECOVI 2001). The survey is based on the World Bank Living Standards Measurement 
Survey model. It is wide-ranging and fairly comprehensive, with detailed information 
about consumption expenditures and income-generating activities. There are important   5
details missing for the purpose of this paper, unfortunately. Specifically, there is no 
information about the ownership of specific assets (the ownership of homes and land 
would be especially good to know more about) or about decision making within the 
household. The survey frame is a stratified random sample, with the two strata defined as 
urban and rural, based on the definitions in Paraguay’s decennial census. Of the 8,131 
households in the overall survey, however, only 2,862 were asked about their 
consumption expenditures; of those households, 2,113 included children. These 
households comprise the sample for this analysis. While the overall survey is nationally 
representative, I cannot say that the subset is as well.
1 In the remainder of the paper, I will 
be implicitly talking about this sample of households. 
The method used follows Kingdon (2005). The regression model is an application 
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where si is the share of household expenditures, xi is total household expenditure, ni is the 
number of household members, nji is the number of household members in age-sex 
category j, zi is a vector of household characteristics, and μi is a stochastic error term, all 
for household i (Kingdon 2005). Household characteristics used include the age and years 
of education of the household head, dummy variables for land- and homeownership, and 
the dependency ratio (number of individuals in the household under 18 or over 64 divided 
by the total number of household members). I test for the presence of objective gender 
patterns using a set of variables for the age-sex composition of the household, the share 
of household members falling into the following categories: boys and girls, aged 0–4, 5–
9, 10–14, 15–19, and 20–24. To test for subjective gender patterns, I add variables that 
are proxies for female bargaining power within the household: MotherOwns and 
MotherOwnsHome for female ownership of land and home; and incshare, the share of 
household income earned by the female spouse or partner. This model allows me to 
                                                 
1 Missing values were multiply imputed using a hot-decking procedure (Reilly 1993; Cranmer and Gill 
2007).   6
simultaneously detect both objective and subjective gender patterns in the allocation of 
consumption expenditure. I apply this model to spending on food and education. Since I 
want to estimate the impact of female bargaining power, I limit the sample to households 
with a male and a female, as head and spouse.
2 
In order to deal with the endogeneity of the woman’s share of household income, 
I run a Heckman selection model using the above variables as independent variables, 
along with years of education and age of the female and the income quintile of the 
household. In the selection equation, the dependent variable is an indicator for positive 
female income. As independent variables, I use the additional variables just mentioned, 
as well as presence of children in the household. With the results of this regression, I 
create a new variable incshare2, which is the residual from the Heckman regression, with 
the exception that I set incshare2 equal to zero if the original incshare is zero. 
I follow Kingdon’s comparative approach, running OLS on the complete sample 
of households with children and then estimating a probit equation for positive spending 
on education, and finally an OLS regression for those households with positive spending. 
The motivation for this is that, as Kingdon points out, the most common method in the 
literature is to run an OLS regression on spending for all households. But since a 
significant number of households will spend zero, this introduces bias into OLS 
regression coefficients. Using the Tobit regression is a possible solution, but it imposes 
the assumption that decisions about whether to spend (on education, for example) and 
how much to spend are made the same way. Hurdle models offer advantages over Tobit, 
in that they are two stage estimators: the first stage estimates the maximum likelihood 
function for positive spending and the second stage estimates the determinants of the 
amount of spending (Kingdon 2005). Finally, I run separate regressions for rural and 
urban households, after testing whether the coefficients were significantly different 
between the two. Using the adjusted Wald test, I was able to reject the null hypothesis 
that all of the coefficients were the same for rural and urban households at the 1% 
confidence level. 
The central question is the presence of gender patterns. In the case of objective 
gender patterns, this will be tested using F tests on marginal effects within age cohorts—
                                                 
2 Note that none of these households are classified as male-headed in the survey.   7
if the marginal effect of age-sex category shares is significantly different by sex within 
age category, this constitutes evidence that the data cannot refute the presence of 
subjective gender patterns. In the case of subjective gender patterns, the significance 
(both statistical and economic) of marginal effects of my proxies for female bargaining 
power within the household is the test. Any conclusions based on these tests come with 
qualifications, of course. Finding consistent significant results would mean that the data 
are not inconsistent with subjective gender patterns. But given the nature of the data at 
hand, it would fall short of proof; rather it would constitute a failure to disprove the 
hypothesis. 
Table 1 shows that there are certainly gendered differences in educational 
outcomes in Paraguay. Illiteracy is significantly higher among women and in rural areas. 
Enrollment rates and private school attendance rates are significantly lower in rural areas. 
Enrollment rates are lower and private school attendance rates are higher, but not 
significantly so, for females. 
Summary statistics for the variables I use in the analysis are presented in table 2. 
In rural households, the average share of expenditures going to education is significantly 
lower than in urban households.
3 Rural households spend, on average, less than one-half 
of what urban households spend per capita. Rural households are also larger than the 
average urban household by more than one-half of a person. Rural households have a 
significantly greater share of younger children.  
The primary female in rural households is less than half as likely to own a home 
as her urban counterpart, although urban households are only slightly more likely to own 
homes.
4 Rural households are twice as likely to own land as urban households. Rural 
households have an extra half a dependent per household member compared to their 
urban counterparts. Primary females are much more likely to have no income in rural 
households than urban, while almost none of the rural households have a primary female 
as the sole income earner. Because of these two dynamics, I report the female share of 
income both for all households and for those households in which it is non-zero. In both 
                                                 
3 For testing the significance of difference in mean values, I used the STATA command svy : mean in 
combination with the lincom post-estimation command to generate the t values reported in table 1. The 
same method is used for table 2. 
4 For both land and home ownership, only those households with title are counted as owners. For those 
households that say they own land or their home but have no title, no individuals are listed as owners.   8
cases, it is significantly smaller in rural households than urban households, though in the 
non-zero case the differences are much smaller.  
Next, I compare shares of household expenditure going to education by area and 
various gender variables (see table 3). Rural households with male children devote 
significantly greater shares of their spending to education, while in urban areas the 
difference in education shares is negative, but not statistically significant. This evidence 
is consistent with an objective gender pattern at work, at least in rural households. Rural 
households with female land rights spend more and urban households with female land 
rights spend significantly less on education. Female homeownership is associated with 
significantly greater spending on education in rural areas. The preliminary analysis thus 
looks promising, at least in terms of finding evidence of objective gender patterns. The 
evidence of subjective gender patterns is mixed. 
 
III. EDUCATION SPENDING BY HOUSEHOLDS 
 
I report the results of the regression analysis in table 4 for rural households and table 5 
for urban households. The first two columns in tables 4 and 5, entitled “Probit and 
Conditional OLS,” report results for the maximum likelihood estimate of spending on 
education by the household and the log of share of expenditures for education, given non-
zero spending, respectively. The third column reports the combined marginal effect for 
each independent variable, computed from the results in the first two columns. The last 
column reports the results of the OLS regression of share of spending on education for all 
rural households. What is immediately obvious is that determinants of the decision to 
spend and how much to spend can behave quite differently. This is the sort of insight that 
hurdle models can bring to the analysis. For example, the share of females in rural 
households aged 20 to 25 significantly decreases the likelihood of spending on education, 
but increases the share spent in the event that spending does occur. Comparing the 
marginal effects to the OLS results provides some contrasts, as well.  
Looking first at the results in table 4, for rural households’ decision on whether 
and how much to spend on education, spending per capita and household size were both 
positive and significant for the decision to spend, but not significant for the amount of   9
spending. Households with more educated heads were significantly more likely to spend 
on education, but those households do not spend significantly more than others. All of the 
age-sex category shares for children aged 5 to 14 were positive and significant for the 
decision to spend, while the share of females aged 20 to 24 significantly decreased the 
likelihood of spending on education. But for the amount of spending, only the shares of 
male and female children aged 10 to 14, males aged 15 to 19, and females aged 20 to 24 
were significant and positive, while the share of boys aged 0 to 4 significantly decreased 
the share of spending on education. The latter result suggests that households with young 
boys might be foregoing spending on their older children to save for the future education 
of the young boy.  
The combined marginal effect incorporates the results of the probit and 
conditional OLS regression. We see that the marginal effect of the share of boys aged 0 
to 4 in the household is negative and significant, while the effect of shares of children 
aged 5 to 14 were positive. 
Turning to the proxies of female bargaining within the household, the ownership 
of assets by women has a significant impact on the decision to spend on education, but 
not on the share of expenditures devoted to education. Interestingly, the direction of the 
effect is negative for landownership and positive for homeownership. Their combined 
marginal effects on education spending are not significant. While the OLS regression 
shows some similarities to the combined marginal effects, we can see important cases 
that are misleading. For example, the indicator for no female income is negative and 
significant in the OLS regression, but not in either of the probit or conditional OLS 
regressions, or in the combined marginal effect. Also, the estimated coefficient share of 
female children aged 20 to 24 is significant and positive, which follows the conditional 
OLS result, but masks the negative effect on the decision to spend on education. 
The decision to spend on education (“Probit” column in table 5) by urban 
households increases significantly with per capita spending. For all children aged 5 to 14 
the estimated coefficients are large, positive, and significant. The share of female 
children aged 0 to 4 significantly decreased the likelihood of education spending of the 
urban household. In terms of the female bargaining power proxy variables, only the 
estimated coefficients for primary female homeownership and the indicator for no   10
income for the primary female were statistically significant, but with countervailing 
signs: the latter was negative, while the former was positive. In terms of the share of 
spending on education in urban households, we can see from the regression of the 
conditional shares of education spending (“Conditional OLS” column, table 5) that 
households that own homes, households that have higher dependency ratios, and 
households with more educated household heads spend a significantly greater share on 
education. The years of education of the household head has a relatively small impact on 
the share of spending on education. The share of females aged 0 to 4 significantly 
decreased spending, while the share of males aged 15 to 24 increased it significantly. 
Looking for signs of subjective gender patterns, we find that the estimated coefficients 
for mothers owning a home are significantly different from zero, large, and negative, 
while the estimated coefficient for female share of income is positive and significant.  
The estimated marginal effects on urban households’ education spending shows 
more statistical significance in general. Expenditures per capita, household size, and 
landownership all significantly increase education spending, while additional years of 
education for the household head significantly decreases it. The latter result is a contrast 
with both the rural results and with the probit conditional OLS and OLS regressions for 
urban households. The age-sex shares follow the rural pattern. Children aged 0 to 4 
reduce the share of education spending, while children aged 5 to 19 increase it. These 
results are all significant with the exception of females aged 15 to 19. The contrast here is 
for males aged 20 to 24, the share of which increases education spending significantly. 
Mothers that own land or have no income decreased education spending shares, while the 
female income share increased it. 
The presence of objective gender patterns requires that the marginal effects for 
each age category be significantly different for the two sexes (for example, ΜΕsM0509 ≠ 
ΜΕsF0509). Table 6 reports the difference in marginal effects (the marginal effect of the 
share of boys minus the marginal effect of the share of girls) on education spending. An 
F test of this hypothesis rejected the null hypothesis that the effects were equivalent in all 
age categories in urban areas, and for ages 0 to 4 and 10 to 14 in rural areas. Among rural 
households, male children aged 0 to 14 reduced spending, while in urban areas the 
opposite was true. In urban households spending was lower for higher shares of male   11
children aged 10 to 14, but higher for all other categories. Confining attention to school-
age children, three of four significant results are positive, so there does seem to be 
evidence of objective gender patters (specifically pro-male bias) in education spending, 
though it is far from clear-cut. 
The evidence for subjective gender patterns among rural households is scant and 
contradictory. Women owning land reduces the likelihood of spending on education, 
while owning homes increases it. Among urban households the evidence is stronger, 
though no less contradictory. Women owning land has an overall negative impact on 
education spending, while women owning homes has a positive effect on the spending 
decision, but a negative effect on the amount, which cancel each other out in the 
combined effect. More suggestively, no female income reduces the likelihood of 
spending and the likely amount of spending, while the female income share raises the 
amount and positively impacts the combined effect. Among urban households then, we 
may say that there is a gender pattern, affected by bargaining power more strongly 
determined by income rather than asset ownership. 
 
IV. EDUCATION SPENDING ON INDIVIDUALS 
 
Kingdon (2005) supplements her household analysis with an analysis of individual 
spending in India to see if aggregation is hiding gender bias that may be more visible at 
the individual level. I also continue my analysis on disaggregated individual-level 
spending data. Table 7 reports average spending (in millions of guaranies) on individuals 
by sex and area. Statistical significance is verified with t tests. Spending is significantly 
lower in rural areas for every age-sex combination, but, within age and area, the 
differences between spending on boys and girls is not statistically significant anywhere. 
Indeed, average spending is greater on boys than girls in urban areas.  
The regression analysis follows the same methodology as that in the household-
level analysis, with the exception that the unit of analysis is now the individual. This 
focus has certain implications for the analysis. First, the regressions are now run within 
age categories. Second, we now have one dummy indicator, male, in place of the age-sex 
category shares. Third, the presence of objective gender patterns will be tested with the   12
significance of the male indicator, rather than as the significance of the difference in 
marginal effects. In addition, I add interaction terms between male and MotherOwns and 
MotherOwnsHome. The results of the analysis are reported in tables 8 and 9 for rural and 
urban households, respectively. 
In rural areas, expenditures per capita have a consistently positive and significant 
effect on the decision to spend, as well as the amount of education spending, as expected. 
This effect is, in all cases, not carried over to the marginal effect, which, though positive, 
is not significant. Household size positively and significantly impacts the decision to 
spend on children aged 10 and up, and significantly increases the amount spent on those 
aged 15 to 19. Higher dependency ratios increase the likelihood of spending on education 
on 5- to 10- and 15- to 19-year-olds, and landownership and more years of education 
increases spending on 5- to 10-year-olds. 
The measure of objective gender patterns, male, has two significant impacts in 
this analysis. There is a significantly greater likelihood of spending on the education of 
male children between 10 and 14; there is significantly less spending on the education of 
boys aged 15 to 19 among individuals on whom positive sums were spent. In all age 
groups, the combined marginal effect is economically small and not statistically 
significant. In all age groups, the signs for mothers owning land and homes are opposite. 
Subjective gender patterns also do not appear to be overwhelmingly in evidence. 
Households with landowning mothers spend significantly more on 15- to 19-year-olds. 
Households with homeowning mothers are more likely to spend on 5- to 9-year-olds and 
spend less on 15- to 19-year-olds. Households with higher female share of income spend 
more on 10- to 14-year-olds and are more likely to spend on 15- to 19-year-olds.  
The interaction terms between male and MotherOwns and MotherOwnsHome are 
interesting. The signs for the coefficients of the two interaction terms are opposite in each 
age group and opposite of the asset ownership variables as well. Although mostly not 
statistically significant, this pattern is curious. Significant impacts include: households in 
which the mother owns land spend more on boys aged 5 to 9 and households with 
mothers that own homes are less likely to spend on boys aged 5 to 9 and spend less on 
boys aged 5 to 9 and 10 to 14.   13
Turning to urban households (table 9) we see some similarities. Households with 
higher expenditures per capita are significantly more likely to spend on education and 
spend significantly more as well. Notably, the combined marginal effect of expenditures 
per capita is significant in the 10 to 14 and 15 to 19 age groups in urban areas. Household 
size has no significant impact on spending among urban households. Higher dependency 
ratios significantly increase the likelihood of spending on the education of 5- to 10-year-
olds, while significantly increasing the amount spent on 5- to 9- and 15- to 19-year-olds. 
Higher dependency ratios also have a significant positive marginal effect on education 
spending on 10- to 14- and 15- to 19-year-olds. Older household heads are significantly 
more likely to spend on the education of 10- to 19-year-olds, and spend significantly 
more on 15- to 19-year-olds. More educated household heads spend significantly more on 
5- to 10- and 15- to 19-year-olds, and the combined marginal effect is significantly 
positive for the latter group. 
There is thin evidence for objective gender patterns in urban areas. The only 
statistically significant result is that boys aged 10 to 14 are more significantly likely to 
receive education spending. This result does match the rural finding. For subjective 
patterns, we have another mixed bag. There are no significant impacts of mothers owning 
land in urban households (no doubt due to the lower incidence of landholdings in urban 
areas). Households in which the mother owned the home spent significantly less on the 
education of 5- to 10- and 15- to 19-year-olds. For the latter group, this result also holds 
in rural households. Households in which the mother earned no income were less likely 
to spend on the education of 5- to 10-year-olds, but the share of female income had no 





This analysis perhaps raises more questions than it answers. Consistent results for 
objective gender patterns across areas were few and far between at the individual level: 
there was significantly greater likelihood of spending on boys aged 10 to 14 and 
significantly less spending on children aged 15 to 19 among households in which mothers   14
owned homes. At the household level, the increase in education spending from the share 
of boys aged 10 to 14 was significantly greater than that of girls aged 10 to 14 in both 
urban and rural areas. But, in the case of children aged 0 to 4, the impact of the share of 
boys decreases education spending more in the rural areas and decreases it less in urban 
areas than the share of girls. So is there pro-male gender bias in education spending in 
Paraguay? At the household level, five of seven significant differences in marginal 
effects were pro-male. At the individual level, two of three significant results were pro-
male. On balance then there seems to be a pro-male bias in education spending, but it is 
not consistent across areas and age groups. 
Why should there not be more uniformity with regard to objective gender patterns 
between town and country? Certainly, if the results supported the argument that the town 
was more or less biased than the country (in terms of objective gender patterns), there 
might be an argument about differing gender norms in the two areas. But there is no 
consistent difference between town and country other than urban households spending 
more on education, and this is surely due to differences in household income and 
opportunity.  
The picture is even less clear for subjective gender patterns. At the household 
level, female landownership had negative impacts (when significant), while at the 
individual level, the only significant impact was positive. Where significant, female 
homeownership had positive impacts on the decision to spend, but negative impacts on 
the amount of spending. This, at least, was consistent across areas and age groups. 
Female income share had a positive impact in the rare case that it had any significant 
impact. Given that the effects of female ownership of different types of assets and female 
income generation differ so greatly, we are left to speculate at why this might be so.  
Another interesting aspect of this analysis is that gender patterns seem to be more 
pronounced at the aggregate household level than at the individual level. The motivating 
question for the Kingdon study was whether aggregation into households was masking 
gender bias (Kingdon 2005). Indeed, Kingdon finds greater evidence of gender bias at the 
individual level than at the household level. In this study, I find the opposite: more 
evidence at the household than at the individual level.   15
More detailed information about asset ownership and decision making is sorely 
needed to enable further analysis that can point the way towards effective policy 
interventions. More detailed knowledge about ownership will certainly help to refine our 
understanding of bargaining power. Without it, parsing the results presented here is akin 
to an exercise in fantasy. One might be tempted to argue that the different results were 
traceable to the fact that land is more of an income-generating asset than a home, so it 
confers greater bargaining power. But the impact of homeownership was more similar to 
the impact of income share than was landownership, so it is difficult to see the 
relationship between women’s economic empowerment within the household and 
bargaining power, at least as reflected in spending on education.  
The question of how this study might inform policy is instructive in underlining 
the need to better understand the dynamics at play. If we want to encourage education 
spending by households, for example, should we encourage female homeownership 
(perhaps by requiring joint title within couples)? If we want to improve educational 
outcomes for females, should policy be designed to increase female landownership 
instead? 
On the broader topic of the nature of gender patterns, more careful attention to the 
nuances of gender processes within households will, I think, be quite fruitful. Separating 
out agency and recipiency will add to our understanding of the dynamics of 
intrahousehold resource allocation. In some cases, there is broad overlap, as in studies of 
labor allocation to plots owned by individuals of different sexes within households. But 
in cases in which those affected by decisions have little or no direct influence in decision 
making, there are likely to be at least two layers of gender processes in play.   16
TABLES 
 
Table 1. Literacy, Enrollment, and Private School 
Enrollment by Area and Sex 
Rural  Urban 
Literacy  Sex 
Illiterate  Literate  Illiterate  Literate 
Male  18.44  81.56  9.87  90.13 
Female  21.86  78.14  11.2  88.8 
Enrollment 
   Not Enrolled  Enrolled  Not Enrolled  Enrolled 
Male  24.15  75.85  12.44  87.56 
Female  20.27  79.73  11.76  88.24 
Type of School 
   Public  Private  Public  Private 
Male  95.63  4.37  72.54  27.46 
Female  94.68  5.32  70.13  29.87 
Source: MECOVI (2001)   17
 
Table 2. Summary Statistics of Regression Variables by Area 
Urban  Rural 
    Mean  
 Linearized 
Std. Err.   Mean  
 Linearized 
Std. Err.   t value 
Education Share of Expenditures          0.074         0.006          0.033          0.002   -5.932** 
Education Expenditures (millionG/individual)         0.141         0.014          0.045          0.003   -6.57** 
Expenditures per capita (G1,000)      620.399       36.066      259.932        13.472   -9.363** 
Household Size          5.021         0.163          5.750          0.216   2.693** 
Share of male children 0-4          0.062         0.005          0.081          0.008   2.066* 
Share of female children 0-4          0.045         0.005          0.072          0.005   3.912** 
Share of male children 5 to 9          0.051         0.005          0.074          0.006   2.823** 
Share of female children 5-9          0.054         0.006          0.055          0.004   0.139 
Share of male children 10-14          0.039         0.005          0.067          0.006   3.902** 
Share of female children 10-14          0.046         0.004          0.056          0.004   1.71† 
Share of male children 15-19          0.044         0.004          0.050          0.005   0.91 
Share of female children 15-19          0.055         0.005          0.043          0.005   -1.636 
Share of male children 20-24          0.034         0.003          0.038          0.004   0.665 
Share of female children 20-24          0.054         0.006          0.042          0.005   -1.62 
Mother Owns Land          0.030         0.010          0.042          0.011   0.772 
Land Owner          0.135         0.019          0.287          0.031   4.231** 
Mother Owns Home          0.111         0.017          0.044          0.012   -3.251** 
Home Owner          0.415         0.034          0.295          0.034   -2.51* 
No Female Income          0.342         0.022          0.545          0.036   4.783** 
Female Share of Income          0.018         0.010          0.002          0.001   -1.738† 
Female Share of Income
a         0.198         0.015          0.116          0.013   -4.137** 
Dependency Ratio          0.770         0.027          1.245          0.062   7.058** 
Age of HH Head        45.253         0.717        44.981          0.797   -0.253 
Years of Education of HH Head        10.130         0.420          4.467          0.211   -12.038**
Significance levels: † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1% 
Source: MECOVI (2001) 
Notes: a. This is only for those households with non-zero primary female income.  
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Std. Err.  Mean 
Linearized 
Std. Err.  t value 
   Without Boys    With Boys     
Rural       0.025        0.004        0.038        0.003   2.864** 
Urban       0.090        0.017        0.076        0.007   -0.796 
   No Female Land 
Rights 
Some Female Land 
Rights    
Rural       0.036        0.003        0.062        0.016   1.644 
Urban       0.079        0.007        0.057        0.009   -2.043* 
   No Female 
Homeowner  Female Homeowner    
Rural       0.036       0.003        0.061        0.012  2.009* 
Urban       0.079       0.007        0.074        0.009  -0.531 
Significance levels: † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%       
Source: MECOVI (2001)          
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Table 4. Rural Regression Results 





Effect  OLS  
Expenditures per Capita  0.305  -0.052  0.008  0.006 
   (0.169)†  (0.123)  (0.006)  (0.004) 
log of Household Size  1.495  0.018  0.043  0.026 
   (0.458)**  (0.330)  (0.019)*  (0.008)** 
Share of female children 0–4   -0.465  -1.024  -0.037  -0.021 
   (1.185)  (0.760)  (0.035)  (0.024) 
Share of male children 0–4   -1.573  -1.751  -0.085  -0.046 
   (1.457)  (0.746)*  (0.047)†  (0.021)* 
Share of female children 5–9   3.709  -0.389  0.097  0.01 
   (1.481)*  (0.937)  (0.052)†  (0.028) 
Share of male children 5–9   3.757  -0.042  0.106  0.027 
   (1.402)**  (0.827)  (0.050)*  (0.027) 
Share of female children 10–14   4.815  1.625  0.175  0.1 
   (1.246)**  (0.666)*  (0.060)**  (0.026)** 
Share of male children 10–14   5.818  1.547  0.202  0.089 
   (1.369)**  (0.588)**  (0.067)**  (0.023)** 
Share of female children 15–19   -0.32  1.073  0.015  0.045 
   (1.073)  (0.797)  (0.035)  (0.021)* 
Share of male children 15–19   -1.373  2.002  0.006  0.055 
   (1.176)  (0.778)*  (0.046)  (0.025)* 
Share of female children 20–24   -2.028  1.556  -0.022  0.035 
   (0.756)**  (0.882)†  (0.043)  (0.019)† 
Share of male children 20–24   0.022  -0.695  -0.015  -0.028 
   (1.136)  (0.728)  (0.032)  (0.018) 
Mother Owns Land   -1.136  0.535  -0.004  0.021 
   (0.416)**  (0.410)  (0.020)  (0.023) 
Land Owner   0.287  -0.114  0.000  -0.001 
   (0.250)  (0.165)  (0.007)  (0.006) 
Mother Owns Home   1.013  0.271  0.014  0.008 
   (0.520)†  (0.529)  (0.021)  (0.023) 
Home Owner   -0.195  0.058  0.000  0.004 
   (0.259)  (0.161)  (0.007)  (0.007) 
No Female Income   -0.169  -0.18  -0.006  -0.007 
   (0.185)  (0.127)  (0.006)  (0.004)† 
Female Share of Income   0.826  0.013  0.024  0.008 
   (0.525)  (0.385)  (0.017)  (0.013) 
Dependency Ratio   -0.148  0.202  0.000  0.002 
   (0.149)  (0.086)*  (0.005)  (0.004) 
Age of HH Head   0.007  -0.002  0.000  0.000 
   (0.011)  (0.007)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Years of Education of HH Head   0.085  0.023  0.003  0.001 
   (0.030)**  (0.017)  (0.001)*  (0.001)† 
Observations   739  557  557  739 
R-squared      0.18     0.27 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1% 
Source: MECOVI (2001)   20
 
Table 5. Urban Education Regression Results 





Effect  OLS  
Expenditures per Capita  1.168  0.035  0.060  0.007 
   (0.220)**  (0.128)  (0.008)**  (0.006) 
log of Household Size  0.711  0.248  0.048  0.026 
   (0.598)  (0.164)  (0.013)**  (0.009)** 
Share of female children 0–4   -3.104  -1.757  -0.241  -0.093 
   (1.489)*  (0.889)*  (0.074)**  (0.049)† 
Share of male children 0–4   -2.467  1.261  -0.185  -0.085 
   (1.530)  (0.807)  (0.061)**  (0.053) 
Share of female children 5–9   7.509  1.221  0.434  0.127 
   (2.400)**  (0.840)  (0.064)**  (0.079) 
Share of male children 5–9   4.309  0.454  0.237  0.017 
   (2.100)*  (0.644)  (0.042)**  (0.041) 
Share of female children 10–14   6.689  0.428  0.354  0.054 
   (3.141)*  (0.795)  (0.053)**  (0.047) 
Share of male children 10–14   17.22  0.108  0.863  0.02 
   (5.501)**  (0.847)  (0.070)**  (0.049) 
Share of female children 15–19   0.092  1.222  0.065  0.079 
   (1.350)  (0.827)  (0.060)  (0.047)† 
Share of male children 15–19   1.025  2.095  0.155  0.137 
   (1.764)  (0.716)**  (0.075)*  (0.053)* 
Share of female children 20–24   -0.253  0.735  0.024  0.017 
   (1.150)  (0.707)  (0.047)  (0.036) 
Share of male children 20–24   1.311  1.786  0.154  0.15 
   (1.221)  (0.871)*  (0.074)*  (0.055)** 
Mother Owns Land   -0.852  -0.055  -0.045  0.002 
   (0.822)  (0.288)  (0.017)*  (0.018) 
Land Owner   0.86  -0.192  0.033  -0.016 
   (0.572)  (0.190)  (0.013)*  (0.014) 
Mother Owns Home   0.675  -0.324  0.017  -0.037 
   (0.383)†  (0.122)**  (0.012)  (0.009)** 
Home Owner   -0.278  0.379  0.005  0.03 
   (0.238)  (0.105)**  (0.013)  (0.007)** 
No Female Income   -0.464  0.094  -0.018  -0.002 
   (0.194)*  (0.086)  (0.006)**  (0.006) 
Female Share of Income   0.565  1.035  0.058  0.065 
   (0.756)  (0.266)**  (0.034)†  (0.023)** 
Dependency Ratio   0.142  0.216  0.012  0.009 
   (0.325)  (0.106)*  (0.009)  (0.008) 
Age of HH Head   0.025  0.005  0.000  0.001 
   (0.015)  (0.007)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Years of Education of HH Head   0.003  0.042  -0.795  0.004 
   (0.027)  (0.010)**  (0.042)**  (0.001)** 
Observations   892  799  799  892 
R-squared      0.27     0.34 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1% 
Source: MECOVI (2001)   21
 
 
Table 6. Difference in Marginal Effects 
   Rural  Urban 
Share of children 0–4   -0.0483**  0.0561** 
              
Share of children 5–9   0.0093   -0.1973** 
              
Share of children 10–14   0.0269*  0.5094** 
              
Share of children 15–19   -0.0089   0.0901** 
              
Share of children 20–24   0.0072   0.1302** 
Significance levels: † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1% 
Source: MECOVI (2001)   22
 
Table 7. Education Spending on Individuals by Area and Sex 
      Urban  Rural    
     
Mean 
(millions G) Std. Err.
Mean 
(millions G) Std. Err.  t 
Female  0.281  0.003  0.057  0.000  -4.129** 
Male  0.213  0.001  0.069  0.000  -4.759**  Age 5 to 9 
t  -1.169     1.466       
Female  0.287  0.001  0.113  0.000  -4.971** 
Male  0.278  0.001  0.113  0.000  -5.839**  Age 10 to 14 
t  -0.273     -0.001       
Female  0.348  0.002  0.100  0.000  -5.856** 
Male  0.344  0.008  0.075  0.000  -2.923**  Age 15 to 19 
t  -0.042     -1.341       
Significance levels: † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1% 
Source: MECOVI (2001)   23
Table 8. Rural Individual Regression Results 
   Ages 5 to 9  Ages 10 to 14  Ages 15 to 19 















Effect  OLS  
Log of Expenditures per capita  0.09  0.682  0.036  0.043  0.857  0.691  0.137  0.09  0.48  0.62  0.121  0.075 
   (0.182)  (0.093)**  (0.079)  (0.008)** (0.167)** (0.079)**  (0.125)  (0.012)** (0.172)** (0.140)**  (0.091)  (0.019)** 
Log of Household Size  -0.275  0.016  -0.015  -0.008  0.44  0.033  0.044  0.014  0.425  0.815  0.123  0.065 
   (0.258)  (0.184)  (0.035)  (0.012)  (0.204)*  (0.174)  (0.047)  (0.013)  (0.226)†  (0.244)**  (0.110)  (0.018)** 
Male  -0.004  0.093  0.004  0.011  0.359  -0.006  0.005  0.005  0.063  -0.264  -0.012  -0.016 
   (0.151)  (0.129)  (0.022)  (0.007)  (0.141)*  (0.077)  (0.030)  (0.008)  (0.166  (0.096)**  (0.041)  (0.016) 
Mother Owns Land  -1.32  -0.511  -0.036  -0.07  -0.646  -0.06  -0.019  -0.007  0.898  0.654  0.165  0.225 
   (0.918)  (0.478)  (0.140)  (0.037)†  (0.767)  (0.441)  (0.109)  (0.083)  (0.593  (0.146)**  (0.152)  (0.033)** 
Land Owner  1.046  -0.022  0.012  0.015  0.362  -0.2  -0.011  0.002  -0.064  -0.226  -0.017  -0.031 
   (0.422)*  (0.130)  (0.079)  (0.012)  (0.416)  (0.188)  (0.062)  (0.017)  (0.238  (0.131)†  (0.048)  (0.023) 
Mother Owns Home  6.759  0.511  0.054  0.099  1.023  0.429  0.057  0.125  -0.011  -1.036  -0.041  -0.186 
   (0.678)**  (0.342)  (0.468)  (0.029)** (0.874)  (0.402)  (0.139)  (0.073)†  (0.645  (0.184)**  (0.150)  (0.041)** 
Home Owner  -0.727  0.096  -0.010  -0.014  -0.497  0.248  0.011  -0.006  0.194  0.244  0.030  0.048 
   (0.446)  (0.183)  (0.065)  (0.014)  (0.447)  (0.196)  (0.072)  (0.018)  (0.251  (0.139)†  (0.055)  (0.023)* 
Male x Mother Owns Land  1.115  0.87  0.088  0.094  0.364  0.378  0.045  0.027  -0.810  -0.431  -0.049  -0.186 
   (0.853)  (0.412)*  (0.148)  (0.029)** (0.577)  (0.414)  (0.108)  (0.068)  (1.220)  (0.293)  (0.215)  (0.071)** 
Male x Mother Owns Home  -6.416  -0.787  -0.047  -0.119  -1.224  -1.143  -0.069  -0.188  0.325  0.59  0.088  0.146 
   (0.007)**  (0.324)*  (0.447)  (0.021)** (0.827)  (0.475)*  (0.225)  (0.075)*  (1.160)  (0.391)  (0.199)  (0.073)* 
No Female Income  -0.047  -0.051  -0.003  -0.007  0.234  0.128  0.014  0.01  -0.189  -0.039  -0.015  -0.021 
   (0.145)  (0.139)  (0.021)  (0.008)  (0.184)  (0.085)  (0.033)  (0.010)  (0.167)  (0.100)  (0.036)  (0.016) 
Female Share of Income   0.51  0.367  0.046  0.006  0.260  0.464  0.063  0.046  1.185  0.077  0.209  0.091 
   (0.657)  (0.291)  (0.081)  (0.022)  (0.495)  (0.270)†  (0.097)  (0.036)  (0.611)†  (0.281)  (0.165)  (0.050)† 
Dependency Ratio  0.190  -0.104  0.006  0.001  0.109  0.047  0.014  0.002  0.169  0.049  0.032  0.019 
   (0.089)*  (0.115)  (0.023)  (0.003)  (0.098)  (0.046)  (0.015)  (0.004)  (0.084)*  (0.07)  (0.025)  (0.011) 
Age of HH Head  0.008  0.006  0.001  0.000  0.01  0.007  0.002  0.001  0.000  0.008  0.000  0.000 
   (0.007)  (0.007)  (0.001)  (0.000)  (0.013)  (0.007)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.007)  (0.006)  (0.002)  (0.001) 
Years of Education of HH Head  0.073  0.027  0.005  0.005  0.041  0.025  0.006  0.002  0.047  0.012  0.009  0.004 
   (0.029)*  (0.018)  (0.007)  (0.001)** (0.033)  (0.022)  (0.007)  (0.003)  (0.036)  (0.021)  (0.008)  (0.003) 
Observations   3560  2645  2645  3560  3540  3010  3010  3540  2505  1045  1045  2505 
R-squared      0.25     0.26     0.26     0.25     0.29     0.18 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%                         
Source: MECOVI (2001)                         
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Table 9. Urban Individual Regression Results 
   Ages 5 to 9  Ages 10 to 14  Ages 15 to 19 















Effect  OLS  
Log of Expenditures per capita  0.439  0.919  0.219  0.181  0.997  0.827  0.367  0.225  0.291  0.557  0.228  0.227 
   (0.226)†  (0.125)**  (0.215)  (0.029)** (0.236)** (0.106)**  (0.144)*  (0.035)** (0.163)† (0.073)**  (0.113)*  (0.055)** 
Log of Household Size  -0.347  -0.114  -0.078  -0.052  -0.416  0.222  -0.039  0.037  -0.416  0.054  -0.128  0.015 
   (0.255)  (0.216)  (0.082)  (0.044)  (0.581)  (0.147)  (0.057)  (0.041)  (0.253)  (0.159)  (0.095)  (0.060) 
Male  -0.16  -0.234  -0.042  -0.037  0.777  0.003  0.002  -0.026  0.099  -0.152  -0.023  0.046 
   (0.307)  (0.146)  (0.079)  (0.037)  (0.332)*  (0.065)  (0.023)  (0.020)  (0.199)  (0.121)  (0.068)  (0.086) 
Mother Owns Land     -0.525     0.182     0.021     0.035  0.325  0.46  0.189  0.327 
      (0.356)     (0.222)     (0.287)     (0.075)  (0.715)  (0.577)  (0.270)  (0.209) 
Land Owner  -0.089  0.152  -0.066  0.018     -0.064     -0.08  0.352  -0.104  0.013  -0.061 
   (0.261)  (0.174)  (0.157)  (0.069)     (0.143)     (0.046)†  (0.201)† (0.134)  (0.081)  (0.069) 
Mother Owns Home  0.756  -0.498  0.045  -0.139     -0.154     -0.045  -0.494  -0.531  -0.143  -0.252 
   (0.543)  (0.166)**  (0.122)  (0.057)*     (0.217)     (0.065)  (0.483)  (0.207)*  (0.173)  (0.106)* 
Home Owner  -0.606  0.29  -0.080  0.015  -0.597  0.094  0.017  0.018  0.335  0.193  0.086  0.108 
   (0.226)**  (0.105)**  (0.139)  (0.036)  (0.348)†  (0.098)  (0.077)  (0.040)  (0.171)† (0.087)*  (0.073)  (0.048)* 
Male x Mother Owns Land     -0.168     -0.41     0.273     0.229  0.024  -0.082  -0.011  -0.123 
      (0.408)     (0.236)†     (0.393)     (0.186)  (0.850)  (0.604)  (0.284)  (0.227) 
Male x Mother Owns Home     0.143     0.084     0.063     0.109  0.527  0.323  0.253  0.116 
      (0.307)     (0.091)     (0.210)     (0.117)  (0.542)  (0.275)  (0.179)  (0.115) 
No Female Income  -0.451  -0.02  0.028  -0.062  -0.073  -0.027  -0.006  -0.014  -0.167  0.105  -0.032  -0.012 
   (0.184)*  (0.138)  (0.089)  (0.041)  (0.317)  (0.073)  (0.040)  (0.023)  (0.168)  (0.109)  (0.060)  (0.044) 
Female Share of Income   -0.132  0.571  -0.049  0.296  0.68  0.214  0.106  0.168  0.54  -0.043  0.173  0.156 
   (0.569)  (0.408)  (0.141)  (0.192)  (0.604)  (0.223)  (0.066)  (0.080)*  (0.488)  (0.262)  (0.160)  (0.107) 
Dependency Ratio  0.32  0.201  0.078  0.074  0.569  0.074  0.134  0.039  0.233  0.178  0.120  0.052 
   (0.108)**  (0.084)*  (0.098)  (0.031)*  (0.408)  (0.053)  (0.034)** (0.020)†  (0.159)  (0.089)*  (0.064)†  (0.040) 
Age of HH Head  0.014  0.006  -0.001  0.003  0.069  0.004  0.069  0.002  0.018  0.015  0.010  0.006 
   (0.013)  (0.006)  (0.039)  (0.002)†  (0.035)*  (0.005)  (0.113)  (0.002)  (0.010)† (0.005)**  (0.005)*  (0.003)† 
Years of Education of HH Head  0.012  0.025  0.091  0.013  0.005  0.014  0.014  0.004  0.021  0.024  0.013  0.013 
   (0.032)  (0.014)†  (0.170)  (0.005)** (0.029)  (0.010)  (0.056)  (0.003)  (0.018)  (0.010)*  (0.007)†  (0.006)* 
Observations   2950  2555  2555  2950  2900  2835  2835  2900  2960  1975  1975  2960 
R-squared      0.54     0.43     0.47     0.42     0.43     0.35 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significance levels: † : 10% * : 5% ** : 1%                         
Source: MECOVI (2001)                           25
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